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Abstract
Attacks on operating system access control have become a significant and in-
creasingly common problem. This type of security threat is recorded in a foren-
sic artifact such as an authentication log. Forensic investigators will generally
examine the log to analyze such incidents. An anomaly is highly correlated to
an attacker’s attempts to compromise the system. In this paper, we propose a
novel method to automatically detect an anomaly in the access control log of an
operating system. The logs will be first preprocessed and then clustered using
an improved MajorClust algorithm to get a better cluster. This technique pro-
vides parameter-free clustering so that it automatically can produce an analysis
report for the forensic investigators. The clustering results will be checked for
anomalies based on a score that considers some factors such as the total mem-
bers in a cluster, the frequency of the events in the log file, and the inter-arrival
time of a specific activity. We also provide a graph-based visualization of logs
to assist the investigators with easy analysis. Experimental results compiled on
an open dataset of a Linux authentication log show that the proposed method
achieved the accuracy of 83.14% in the authentication log dataset.
Keywords: authentication log, improved MajorClust, event log forensics,
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Access controls limit what actions user can perform in a specific environment
such as an application or operating system. In this research, we mainly consider
the access controls in an operating system. For example, this log is available
in auth.log under the /var/log/ directory in a Debian-based Linux environ-5
ment or /var/log/secure in RedHat family distributions. It provides a log of
Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) that record the user’s granted access
[1] and also secure shell (SSH) accesses, both failed and successful ones. This
artifact is important evidence for the forensic investigators or security analysts
to trace the attackers and analyze the incidents in a server.10
For auth.log analysis, there is OSSEC (Open Source Host-based Intrusion
Detection System Security), which also considers other log files to detect sus-
picious activities in a host [2]. Some examples of OSSEC implementation to
detect access violations and multiple failed logins were presented in [3] while its
complete guide is described in [4]. Other research on auth.log investigation15
was proposed by Sato and Yamauchi [5]. They first provided an architecture
for securing log files and then proposed tampering detection of system logs in-
cluding auth.log. In addition, Basin et al. gave a brief explanation of possible
attacks and a simple examination using existing tools to check the traces for
attempted attacks. As a result, we can see a trail in the security log such as20
auth.log [6].
One of the applications that record activities in auth.log is the SSH server.
Detection of brute force attacks is critical because recent reports show this type
of attack is frequently conducted where SSH service is widely targeted [7]. In-
stead of doing forensic analysis, most research have conducted a proactive mech-25
anism to prevent the dictionary attack [8, 9]. The authors presented a detection
and defense architecture for SSH threats based on the authentication log. An-
other attempt to create a model for brute force profiling was proposed by Javed















The application of text clustering in digital evidence has also been proposed
to increase the relevance of the search results [11]. Several papers have tried to
cluster the event log and detect its outliers, but the threshold for the anomaly
scores was not sophisticated since the user must tune it manually to get the
best results [12, 13].35
In this paper, we consider SSH records as well as PAM authentication in
auth.log. The proposed method identifies any log activities that are suspicious
and labels them as outliers after the clustering phase. We propose a parameter-
free algorithm to cluster this log and conduct anomaly detection, which refers
to establish a baseline norm and detecting deviations from it. These deviations40
can be an attack or other strange events which need attention from the forensic
analysts. However, the experiments focus on brute force password attacks as this
is the most common type of access control violation [7]. The term parameter-
free means that the clustering algorithm will run without any initial guess or
any parameter supplied.45
Most existing techniques need a manual input of the number of clusters.
The classical k-Means and its variants still need the number of clusters as a
parameter to run [14] while hierarchical clustering requires a specific level at
which to cut the generated tree or dendrogram [15]. Density-based clustering
and its extensions are other alternatives, but they require the neighborhood size50
to be passed as a user-defined variable [16].
Another technique, namely MajorClust, is a parameterless method that clus-
ters nodes based on its natural structure in the graph [17]. MajorClust has been
extended to a fuzzy version [18] and probability-based approach, so it can work
well with several structures on the local scale [19]. However, we will improve55
MajorClust by adding a condition when the processed node’s cluster is not the
same as the heaviest neighbor node’s cluster, we will force it to follow the clus-
ter of the heaviest one. Therefore, an event will stick to the most similar one
instead of following the others, which are not so similar but has more edge
weight aggregation. This will improve the performance of clustering so that it60














method based on refined MajorClust.
2. Proposed method
We define some formal terms in this paper. An event log or a log file is a file
that records activities from an application or services such as authentication log65
from SSH server application. A record is defined as a single entry in the event
log. Then, an event is defined as a message in a record.
The proposed method is illustrated in Figure 1. First, the raw log will be
preprocessed and converted into a graph model. Second, we enter the clustering
phase which consists of four steps:70
1. Cluster graph using improved MajorClust (Phase 1);
2. Create new representation of graph based on multiple longest common
substring (MLCS) to solve the overfitting problem (Phase 2);
3. Refine the new form of cluster by running improved MajorClust once again
(Phase 3);75
4. Produce clustering result using initial graph representation (Phase 4).
After that, we conduct anomaly calculation on the clustering results based on a
score considering several properties that characterize each cluster. An estimated
threshold for anomalousness is provided to detect this behavior automatically.
The last step is to provide a visualization of the detected outliers. The details80
of each phase are described in the following subsections.
2.1. Log preprocessing and proposed graph model
In this paper, the digital evidence to be investigated is the authentication
log file (auth.log) in a Linux environment. It is assumed that the log file has
not been tampered with or modified by the attackers. The full set of features85
for analysis are datetime, hostname, service or process name, process identifier
(PID), and the event. The feature used in log preprocessing step is only the
event since we focus on the content of the log and we do not consider other














Figure 1: Block diagram of proposed method
only temporarily omit these features in the clustering process. For example, we90
need datetime property for calculating the anomaly score later. Other ignored
properties include the hostname of the server, type of log and its process ID
(PID), e.g., sshd[2790] and CRON[2839]. We filter all events, so it will produce
only the unique one and attach the row log identifier to every unique event.
Furthermore, all numeric characters and stopwords in unique events are re-95
moved. We include some additional words that are not included in standard
English stopwords but exist in the log record, e.g., preauth, from, for, port, sshd,
ssh, and root. To identify non-standard stopwords, we conducted the experi-
ments and checked the results of the graph clustering. If the results are not
formed well, we analyze the string message and add the stopwords in order to100
increase the clustering accuracy. The added stopwords commonly appear in the
string and if not removed it will send the different messages into one cluster.
Moreover, a tf−idf (term frequency−inverse document frequency) proce-
dure is implemented in every filtered line to produce its numerical representa-
tion. Note that in our case, document d refers to a single line of log record l.
First, term frequency, tf , is not only the number of occurrences of term t in log




















Second, we need to calculate inverse document frequency of term t, idft, as
shown in the equation below:




where N is the number of lines in the event log, and dft is the total number
of lines in which the term occurs. We modify a basic formula of tft,l and idft
from [20] to conform with the real event log and avoid a zero value. Finally, we
calculate tf−idf of term t as follows:
tf−idft,l = tft,l × idft (3)
The next step is to build a graph G = (V,E,w) where V , a set of vertices,














two vertices where its weight, w, is the cosine distance to measure the similarity
between two events in a single log record l as seen below [20]:
w(l1, l2) =
~V (l1) · ~V (l2)
|~V (l1)||~V (l2)|
(4)
where the numerator denotes the dot product of the vector ~V (l1) and ~V (l2)
which is represented as
∑p
i=0
~Vi(l1)~Vi(l2). On the other hand, the denominator
is the product of their Euclidean lengths and defined as
√∑d
i=0
~V 2i (l) where d105
is the total number of the term calculated in a record l. This cosine similarity
distance becomes the edge weight of two vertices. An example of the proposed
graph model is shown in Figure 2. We can see that every vertex is connected to
other vertices except its zero distance since the edge is only created when the
cosine similarity is greater than zero.110
To provide a more clear illustration of cosine similarity in the event log, we
give a step by step example of how this measurement is calculated between two
events as follow.
Step 1: Two events from an event log115
Dec 1 23:05:20 ip-172-31-27-153 sshd[28547]: Invalid user test from 192.208.179.82
Dec 1 23:36:42 ip-172-31-27-153 sshd[28578]: Invalid user admin from 187.76.79.142
Step 2: Preprocessing
l1: invalid user test120
l2: invalid user admin
Step 3: Calculating term-frequency (tf)
Event invalid user test admin
l1 1 1 1 0















Step 4: Calculating normalized term-frequency (tf) based on Equation 1
Event invalid user test admin
l1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0
l2 0.3 0.3 0 0.3
Step 5: Calculating inverse document frequency (idf) based on Equation 2
idfinvalid = 1 + log 2/2 = 1
idfuser = 1 + log 2/2 = 1
idftest = 1 + log 2/1 = 0.693130
idfadmin = 1 + log 2/1 = 0.693
Step 6: Calculating tf − idf based on Equation 3
Event invalid user test admin
l1 0.3*1 0.3*1 0.3*0.693 0
l2 0.3*1 0.3*1 0 0.3*0.693
Event invalid user test admin
l1 0.3 0.3 0.208 0
l2 0.3 0.3 0 0.208
Step 7: Calculating the numerator of cosine similarity
|~V (l1)| · |~V (l2)| = 0.3*0.3 + 0.3*0.3 + 0.208*0 + 0*0.208135
= 0.09 + 0.09 + 0 + 0
= 0.18
Step 8: Calculating the denominator of cosine similarity
|~V (l1)| = sqrt(0.32 + 0.32 + 0.2082 + 02)140
















|~V (l2)| = sqrt(0.32 + 0.32 + 02 + 0.2082)
= sqrt(0.09 + 0.09 + 0 + 0.043)145
= sqrt(0.223)
= 0.472
Step 9: Calculating the cosine similarity based on Step 7, 8, and Equation 4
w(l1, l2) = numerator / denominator150
= 0.18 / (0.472 * 0.472)
= 0.18 / 0.228
= 0.789
2.2. Event log clustering based on improved MajorClust155
The first phase to detect the anomaly is to cluster the generated graph using
the MajorClust algorithm. For the sake of completeness, we include a brief
technical description of MajorClust. For details of the algorithm, the reader is
referred to [17]. Initially, each node is attached to its own cluster. For each





w(eij ), 0 ≤ i ≤ m (5)
where ci is the i
th neighboring clusters, w(e) is the edge weight for each neigh-
boring node in a particular cluster, m is the total of the neighboring cluster i,
and n is the total member of vertices in the cluster ci. The next step is assigning
each vertex to a cluster, which has maximum weight aggregation and is defined
as:
c∗ = arg maxi(ci) (6)
This process is continued until all possible combination checking for current and
assigned clusters for each node is accomplished.
However, we identified a major drawback in the original MajorClust tech-














Figure 3: The drawback of MajorClust with more vertices
of nodes since it only depends on the accumulated weight of the neighboring160
vertices. A node will only depend on the aggregate weight of the neighbors al-
though it is less relevant and does not consider the more similar cosine distance.
This shortcoming is illustrated in Figure 3 and indicated by a large green
node with label pam_unix(cron:session): session closed for user root.
This node should create its own cluster since it is closer with another vertex165
with a more similar event.
Therefore, we improve the MajorClust by supplying the additional require-
ment that when the current cluster is not the same as the heaviest neighbor
node, we force the operating node to follow the cluster of the heaviest one.
The heavier the edge weight, the closer the distance between two events in the
log record since it represents the cosine similarity. By deploying this improve-
ment, an event will stick to the most similar one instead of following the others,














Figure 4: The improvement of MajorClust algorithm
Equation (6) as follows:
c =





where c is the current cluster considering additional checking, h is a neighbor
node with the heaviest edge weight, and c(h) is the cluster label of h. The
illustration of this improvement is depicted in Figure 4. We can see that the
node in the previous figure has created a new cluster as expected (indicated by170
vertices in red).
Nevertheless, this improvement triggers another problem. The generated
cluster is overfitting since it produces many small clusters with only two or
three vertices as shown in Figure 5. This issue was found when the proposed
procedure processed the first 500 records of the first-day log in the dataset. We175














Figure 5: Overfitting cluster produced by improved MajorClust
refine cluster phase and is described as follows. First, we represent each cluster
as a single node. We maintain the start and end time of the overall event log for
each cluster to be considered for the anomaly score calculation. The frequency
of an event occurring in all nodes in the cluster and updated tf−idf is also180
counted.
To represent an event of a newly formed node, we need a string which reflects
all events in a cluster. We can consider this as the longest common subsequence
problem with many strings, or well-known as the multiple longest common sub-
sequence (MLCS) technique. Solutions of this classical problem have been pro-185
posed in the recent literature [21, 22]. For each cluster c, we will check for the
most common substring occurring in the raw log. The terms ”subsequence”
and ”substring” will be used interchangeably since the substring has the same
meaning as a subsequence in our case, and we then describe MLCS concisely.














subscript number represents the index of a character in l, s = sw1sw2 . . . swq ,
p and q are their length respectively, s is called subsequence of l, sub(l, s), if it
meets the following:
sub(l, s) =
1 ≤ v ≤ q if 1 ≤ wv ≤ p1 ≤ t < u ≤ q if wt < wu (8)
Furthermore, let L = {l1, l2, . . . , lo} be a set of raw events in the specific c,190
o is total number of logs within each c, multiple longest common subsequence
for set L is a sequence of s if and only if (i) s is the subsequence of li for 1 ≤ i ≤ o
and (ii) s is the longest one satisfying (i). We then apply MLCS to all clusters
to find the longest substring of L.
After that, we run the MajorClust algorithm again using current graph com-195
position. The result of the refine cluster phase is given in Figure 6. After this
phase is complete, we convert the generated graph back to its original nodes rep-
resentation since we still maintain the initial vertices of the formed new node.
This technique will provide us with a better clustering result as shown in Figure
7. The output of this phase is a complete graph where each node has its own200
cluster label property.
It should be noted that the algorithm converges smoothly. The reasons are
two-fold. First, the clustering algorithm works on a node by node basis. When
a node is processed, the node is flagged, and the algorithm moves to the next
node and so on. Second, the proposed improvement of MajorClust will ensure205
a node to have the same cluster as its heaviest edge neighbor. Using these two
conditions, the algorithm will smoothly converge without any oscillation.
2.3. Anomaly detection of possible attacks
The nature of an anomaly is that it is different from other clusters [23].
Ideally, it will have a fewer members than others, but this assumption is not210
always true. Based on our extensive experiments and analysis on the public
datasets from Security Repository (SecRepo) [24], the anomaly is the biggest














Figure 6: The result of refine cluster phase
of the access control log, the anomaly is highly correlated with total attacks or
failed authorization of login attempts. The proposed technique will assist the215
forensic investigator to examine the real-life log that usually has a very large
size.
One approach to discover the anomaly from the clustering result is to check
the number of cluster members. If the number is below the given threshold,
then it can be decided that there is an outlier in the cluster [25]. However, this220
procedure is not suitable for the access control case since the anomaly can occur
with a large number of members in a cluster. Thus, we develop our own score
to determine whether or not a cluster is an anomaly.
To achieve good outlier detection results, we define some parameters to cal-














Figure 7: The final clustering of improved MajorClust algorithm
nodes, total members, and the inter-arrival rate of the event time. Note that
the anomaly score measurement is conducted after the refine cluster phase and
before it is converted back to the original graph representation.
We define the anomaly score as the ratio of event frequency per cluster
to the total frequency in the graph. It is then multiplied by the inter-arrival230
rate between the first and the last events in a cluster. The high or low event
frequency is likely to be an anomaly because the legal event will have a normal
frequency. Furthermore, a very high or a very low inter-arrival rate can also be
regarded as an anomaly. The event frequency and inter-arrival time between
events are mainly used to detect SSH brute-force attacks. For example, some235
research include the event frequency [9] and inter-arrival rate of the events [26]
as a part of the score to detect the malicious SSH activities. Both variables are
considered in [10] as well.




















where fi and Ni are frequency and total nodes per vertex from the refine cluster
phase, respectively. In addition, n is the total member of vertices in the cluster
ci. The anomaly will occur when there are so many events occurring in the
adjacent time while the normal event shows the opposite behavior. Formally,






where t1 is the first time an event occurred, tn is the last one, and both of
them are measured in seconds. When the denominator produces a zero value,240
it means that there are several events in a second, and we set tn − t1 with very
small value to show that its arrival rate is very high in the short time frame.








where M is total members in c, N is total nodes in a cluster, F is total frequencies
in c, and z is total clusters in the analyzed log data. We refer to Equation (9)
and (10) for µf and I, respectively.245
2.3.1. Estimation of anomaly threshold
To decide whether or not a cluster is an anomaly, we estimate a threshold
to provide a recommendation for the forensic investigator or security analyst.
We introduce an estimation for the anomaly parameter. There are three types
of activities recorded in the log file: low intensity, normal, and high intensity250
[10, 27]. Low intensity refers to a sporadic attack while high intensity usually
related to a brute-force attacks. In addition, the normal activities will produce
a non-suspicious log.



















where ai is an anomaly score in a cluster i, A is a set of anomaly scores for all
clusters, and a′i is a normalized score of ai.255
Next, we fit this normalized score to a quadratic equation since this equation
fits the characteristics of the dataset where low and high intensity event will be
defined as anomalies. The quadratic equation fits a′ as axis to [0,1] and a′′ as





i − 4 (13)
Subsequently, we have a second normalization step for anomaly score a′′ to
range [-1,1] where 0 is the threshold for the anomaly decision. The final anomaly
score per cluster αi is depicted below where p = −1 and q = 1 as the range
boundaries.
αi = p+
(a′′i −min(A′))(q − p)
max(A′)−min(A′)
(14)
If the αi score is less than 0, then a cluster i is set as an anomaly and vice versa.
Thus, the user is not required to enter the parameter to calculate the anomaly
score.
2.4. Visualization of access control anomaly
In order to help the investigators in analyzing and getting a better under-260
standing of the security log, there are some methods available for log visualiza-
tion. For example, Takada and Koike created Tudumi, a visualization tool for
auditing syslog, wtmp, and sulog based on layered concentric disks [28]. For
each layer, there were some notations such as spheres and cubes to represent the
user and his activities. The treemaps model to display clustering result from265
the Simple Log file Clustering Tool (SLCT) [12] of the event log was introduced
and named LogView [29]. Another approach was using parallel coordinates to














Elvis (Extensible Log Visualization) is a recent implementation to display an
Apache log, syslog, and auth.log [30]. This technique was based on a custom270
organization (categorical and geographical) and log augmentation. Visual Filter
enabled the security analyst to inspect the whole logs, creates a filter visually,
performs navigation, and sub-selects the part of the log interactively [31]. In
addition, Trethowen et al. introduced VisRAID to visualize remote access logs,
especially for intrusion detection purposes and focused on timeline visualization275
[32].
However, existing methods do not apply graph visualization to the assistance
tool for log analysis. Naturally, since the clustering is based on a graph, the
proposed visualization also heavily relies on this model. Therefore, we propose
analysis and anomaly display of the authentication log based on graph visualiza-280
tion. We categorize the visualization into two types: static and dynamic. The
static model displays the graph after the analysis is complete while the dynamic
one provides live visualization when the analysis is running.
We use Gephi for the graph visualization for both types [33]. We then exploit
the streaming server plugin [34] and its Python client implementation [35] to285
support a dynamic model. In the static mode, the visualization is displayed
after the clustering and anomaly detection process is finished. The output of
the forensic analysis is a graph file, i.e., dot file and then it is exported to Gephi.
To get the intuitive display, we use two steps of the graph layout algorithm: first
Force Atlas 2 [36] and then Fruchterman Reingold [37]. These two algorithms290
have been natively integrated into Gephi.
Force Atlas 2 produces clustered nodes, but there are still many overlaps
between them, Fruchterman Reingold will remove these obstacles, and provide
a clearer layout. While in the dynamic mode, the visualization follows the
analysis process starting from creating nodes, edges, graph clustering, refining295
the cluster, and anomaly detection. The result is clean and concise since the
procedure has removed unnecessary edges that connect one cluster to the other














Figure 8: Initial clustering result of the first day in the dataset (November 30, 2014)
3. Experimental results and discussions
3.1. Functionality testing for SecRepo dataset300
The dataset for the experiments is taken from the public and open Security
Repository (SecRepo). It includes 86,839 lines of auth.log taken from Novem-
ber 30 to December 31, 2014, and mainly contains failed SSH login attempts
[24]. This kind of attack will be flagged as an anomaly in the whole log file. We
utilize NetworkX to create and manipulate the graph [38], Gephi as graph visu-305
alization tools [33], a Gephi streaming server plugin [34] and Gephi streaming
client [35] to dynamically draw a graph to Gephi, and Natural Language Toolkit
(NLTK) to provide English corpus for log text preprocessing, especially in pro-
viding stopwords [39]. We utilize the Python programming language version 2.7
to assemble all of these libraries and provide this log forensic tool.310














Figure 9: The result of refine cluster phase from Figure 8
(November 30, 2014) while Figure 9 illustrates the refine cluster phase. There
are too many small clusters in the initial step and it is fixed in the next phase.
The anomaly detection result is depicted in Figure 10 where the red vertices
represent the anomaly and the green represents the normal events. This figure315
is completed with the label of an event in the access control log. The outlier is
measured when a cluster is on the refine cluster phase based on the estimated
threshold.
We can see in Figure 10 that the detected anomaly is an invalid user
event as shown in the largest cluster. There are small clusters with similar320
events such as invalid user tomcat, invalid user cms, invalid user dev,
and invalid user google. These clusters create their own cluster since the














Figure 10: Anomaly detection in refine cluster phase
the bigger cluster, which has less cosine similarity.
In addition, the pam_unix(cron:session) session is a daemon event run325
in the background so it is successfully categorized as normal. The other two
nodes in green, i.e., connection close by and connection reset by peer
is a false positive since these events will only happen when there are failed
authorizations. The calculation of the accuracy and performance of the proposed
method will be explained later in this section.330
Figure 11 is the full version of Figure 10 which is converted back to its ini-
tial graph representation where it has 688 rows of the event log and is modeled
into 173 nodes and 9,694 edges. To produce a good display of anomaly detec-
tion, these visualizations are generated after two runs of the layout algorithm,
i.e., Force Atlas 2, then followed by Fruchterman Reingold, and successfully335














Figure 11: Final result of the forensic analysis in the first day of authentication log (November
30, 2014)
3.2. Evaluation metrics
Furthermore, we use some standard measurements to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the proposed method such as true positive (tp), true negative (tn),
false positive (fp), false negative (fn), sensitivity, specificity, and accuracy. The340










While sensitivity is focused on measuring the improved MajorClust’s ability














measure since it also includes true negative (tn) as denoted below:345
Accuracy =
tp+ tn
tp+ fp+ fn+ tn
(17)
In this case, true negative refers to detected anomaly record is also defined
as anomaly in the dataset. Before calculating tp, tn, fp, and fn, we label the
dataset with normal and anomaly then compare it to the proposed method’s
decision.
3.3. Comparison with existing methods350
To compare the robustness of the improved MajorClust and proposed anomaly
score, we evaluate other methods to the same testing dataset. We run the Simple
Log Clustering Tool (slct) version 0.05 [12] and LogCluster version 0.03 [40] as
the clustering-based anomaly detection in event logs. In addition, we also com-
pare the proposed method with two rule-based anomaly detections, i.e., OSSEC355
version 2.8.3 [2, 3, 4] and swatch version 3.2.3 [41]. These two applications
can be turned into forensic analysis tools since they were initially designed to
monitor real-time log file. We also compare the proposed method with standard
MajorClust and improved MajorClust without refine cluster phase. They will
be combined with the proposed outlier detection mechanism since they do not360
have one.
3.3.1. Parameter tuning for sclt and LogCluster
To objectively compare those methods, we have trained other tools’ param-
eter to get their best accuracy. Therefore, the dataset was divided into two
parts. The first part is November 30 to December 14 as the training set and365
the second one is December 15 to 31 as the testing set. The training set is
used for parameter tuning while the testing set is for performance comparison
as presented in Subsection 3.3.2.
The parameter -support or -s in slct and --support in LogCluster have been
tuned from 10 to 100. Then we checked which value generates the best accuracy.370














Table 1: Parameter tuning -s for slct and --support for LogCluster
Value of -s or Accuracy Accuracy











the threshold for the number of cluster member is 100 lines. As a consequence,
log lines that do not belong to any cluster will be defined as an anomaly. The
similar parameter is applicable to LogCluster and we set the option --support
to 100 since it produces the best accuracy. The result of parameter tuning for375
slct and LogCluster is presented in Table 1.
The rules used in OSSEC and swatch are based on regular expressions. Since
the swatch tool does not provide any standard rules, we set them by adding
three most frequent malicious strings in the event log. They are ([iI]nvalid [uU]ser,
Did not receive identification string, and reverse mapping). On the380
other hand, the OSSEC tool has provided the set of rules in an XML file. We
followed these default rules.
3.3.2. Comparison results
The comparison of the proposed technique and the state of the art is given
in Table 2. As shown in Table 2, the best sensitivity value was achieved by385
swatch. This indicates that it has a very good capability to detect the normal
activities in the log since we manually configure the regular expression rules that














Table 2: Comparison of proposed technique and the other methods
Methods Sensitivity (%) Specificity (%) Accuracy (%)
Proposed method 70.59 82.21 83.14
Proposed method without 88.24 50.25 52.43
refine cluster phase
Standard MajorClust [17] 0.00 78.08 73.61
slct [12] 87.50 4.88 13.54
LogCluster [40] 73.21 17.94 23.73
OSSEC [2] 25.11 30.12 29.59
swatch [41] 100.00 54.13 58.94
sensitivity and specificity rate of 70.59% and 82.21%, respectively. On the other
hand, the other techniques produce lower specificity. The improved MajorClust390
is able to provide highest accuracy value (83.14%) while the others do not. The
difference in accuracy is significant which indicates that existing methods are
unable to properly detect the suspicious logs in the testing data.
We can see that the standard MajorClust without modifications does not
work well and even it gives zero sensitivity. On the other hand, the refine395
cluster phase is hardly needed to improve the accuracy. Note that these two
methods use the proposed anomaly score estimation.
The drawback of previous clustering-based anomaly detection is the assump-
tion that the outlier is the data residing on a small cluster. This idea does not
work in the authentication log with a high number of attacks since these viola-400
tions produce many records and can create the largest cluster in the analysis.
Moreover, the rule-based anomaly detections contribute to the poor performance
of anomalous discovery when the supplied regular expressions do not suit with
the case. The default rule should be updated regularly by the network ana-
lysts in order to make sure all security breaches are detected. However, it can405
produce good true positive rates (sensitivity).
To supply the forensic investigator with more insight, we also enumerate the














Table 3: The most frequent events in the authentication log (testing dataset)
No Event Frequency
1 Invalid user 12,743
2 Received disconnect 11,464
3 pam_unix(cron:session) 2,708
4 IP does not map back to the address 1,328
5 Reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo failed 1,216
3. The invalid user shows that there is an attempt from an unregistered
user to login to the server. The event received disconnect means that an410
error occurred in the authentication process. The attacker is usually trying to
conduct SSH brute force and the server decides to disconnect the connection.
There are warning messages such as IP does not map back to the address
and reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo failed in the event. The sys-
tem records these two events because the client’s reverse DNS record does415
not match with the hostname used to identify the client’s identity. Event
pam_unix(cron:session) means that the daemon activity is generated from
the default configuration of Linux operating system. This record is written
when the system checks the authentication mechanism and it happens every
hour by default. From this analysis, we can infer that there are so many at-420
tempts to violate the access control, especially SSH, in the server.
3.4. Experiment on the Kippo log
In this section, we present one more experiment to another dataset, i.e.,
Kippo log, to prove that the proposed method works well to another dataset
with another attack. Kippo is an SSH honeypot and created in Python [42].425
We install and configure Kippo on DigitalOcean droplet with public IP address
so everyone including real attackers and botnet can reach this server. All the
activities were recorded from 14 to 20 February 2017.
Beside the attack from the internet, we add one more activity that is usu-














of reconnaissance step to get banner or fingerprint of the SSH server version
using the telnet application. This experiment shows that the proposed method
performs well with 52.89% sensitivity, 92.77% specificity, and 87.35% accuracy.
4. Conclusion and future works
We propose an improved MajorClust algorithm to cluster the authentication435
log as the basis of anomaly detection of suspicious activities related to access
control violations. The experimental results show that the proposed method is
able to provide assistance to the forensic investigator, security analyst, or system
administrator in inspecting and visualizing the log file. In the experiment, it
achieves 70.59% of sensitivity, 82.21% of specificity, and 83.14% of accuracy.440
In future, we would like to improve the similarity measure between two log
records using semantic analysis since it considers the meaning, context, and
linguistic aspect while tf−idf only calculates the frequency of terms. This mea-
surement is expected to increase the accuracy of the anomaly detection phase.
The clustering of the log file is still an open challenge for good performance of445
the analysis since the improved MajorClust, in some circumstances, failed to
produce a precise cluster. In addition, the proposed method can be deployed
to other types of event logs such as syslog, web server log, web proxy log, and
many more.
Since the log data has been converted to graph data structure, we will add450
tamper detection using graph watermarks in the future. This method works
by adding a subgraph to the main graph completed with a graph key and the
instance’s key [43]. The instance can be another process which saves the log files
and it can reside in the same server as event log or in other servers. Watermarks
guarantee the integrity of the log files and also provides a leak detection, so the455
suspected instance will be easily detected.
It is also worth noting that the runtime of the authentication log forensic
analysis can still be improved. Some research in the digital investigation area














the proposed method to increase the processing time so that the authorities will460
receive the result and report it immediately. This is one of our priorities since
we believe that the evidence not only originates from a single host but can also
be obtained from a cluster environment.
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